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Information Leakage Threats for Cryptographic 
Devices Using IEMI and EM Emission  
Abstract—In this paper, we present a new information leakage 
threat combining intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) 
and observations of EM leakage. In previous studies, the analysis 
of secret key information in cryptographic modules using fault 
injection has led to methods whereby faults can be injected via 
low-voltage IEMI. However, the timing of fault injections cannot 
be controlled with this approach, and it is difficult to obtain faulty 
ciphertexts for use in secret key analysis by differential fault 
analysis (DFA). To overcome this problem, we propose a method 
for estimating the fault injection timing by detecting characteristic 
fluctuations in the EM leakage from the device. As a result, it may 
be possible to implement a realistic secret information analysis 
method applicable to a wide range of devices. First, to show the 
feasibility of the proposed method, we describe an experiment 
using an on-chip fault injection circuit that can control the 
injection timing. Furthermore, we apply a fault analysis method 
that combines the injection timing estimation method and fault 
injection by IEMI in a practical experimental environment. We 
select useful faulty ciphertexts using the proposed method, and 
then perform secret key analysis by DFA. Experimental results 
demonstrate that the secret key can be successfully analyzed. 
Keywords—fault analysis; EM information leakage; intentional 
electromagnetic interference; fault injection timing 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ault injection attacks obtain secret information by 
inserting faults into a target cryptographic device. The attack 
model of fault injection was first proposed by Boneh et al. 
in 1997 as an attack method against public-key cryptosystems 
[1]. Following this pioneering work, Biham and Shamir 
proposed differential fault analysis (DFA) [2] against 
symmetric-key cryptosystems such as the Data Encryption 
Standard (DES). In recent years, many DFA methods have been 
proposed, including those against the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) [3-5]. 
With the development of fault-based attacks, various fault 
injection techniques have also been proposed and investigated 
[6-8]. Such techniques include optical fault injection using flash 
or laser [6]; under-powering to cause setup time violations [7]; 
and electromagnetic (EM) pulse injection over cryptographic 
integrated circuits (ICs) [8]. These fault injection techniques 
either require physical access to the target device or assume that 
the device is under the attacker’s control. Therefore, it is difficult 
to perform such attacks against devices with a protective 
mechanism such as a special chassis or a tamper detector. 
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In recent years, a non-invasively executable fault injection 
method has been proposed [9]. This method injects continuous 
sinusoidal EM waves via cables attached to the target device, 
and therefore requires neither a close approach to the device nor 
any modification to the condition of the device. This makes fault 
injection easier than in previous methods, and increases the 
number of target devices to include those immune to 
conventional fault attacks. 
In [9], continuous sinusoidal waves of a specific frequency 
are injected, providing a highly efficient means of transmitting 
power to a device. The sinusoidal waves only cause faults in the 
target’s cryptographic modules, with other modules continuing 
to work normally. However, such continuous waves can cause 
faults with random timing, which makes it difficult to determine 
whether the observed encryption output can be used to derive 
secret information. 
In this paper, we present a method for estimating the time or 
processing step at which a fault occurs. In this method, the fault 
occurrence time or processing step is identified by observing 
EM leakages such as the fluctuation of EM waves emitted from 
cryptographic modules. Even when using a fault injection 
method with random timing, such as intentional electromagnetic 
interference (IEMI), it is possible to select some faulty 
ciphertext that has been output by the encryption process when 
a fault occurs at a specific time. Note that the conventional 
TEMPEST, Side-channel Attack, and Fault Injection focus on 
leakages or interference to degrade the security of equipment. 
We focus on both leakages and interference in considering the 
potential for security degradation. By focusing on both aspects, 
it is possible to analyze the secret key by DFA using the output 
of random-time fault injection.  
To evaluate the feasibility of our method, we conduct a 
random fault injection experiment using continuous sinusoidal 
EM waves via a power cable attached to a target device. In this 
experiment, we estimate the fault injection timing using the EM 
leakage observed during the cryptographic operation. In addition, 
we select some outputs that are injected into one or several error 
bytes in the intermediate result of the specific encryption step. 
We confirm that the secret key can be analyzed by DFA using 
these faulty outputs. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II describes 
our fault injection time estimation method, in which fluctuations 
in EM leakage are observed. In addition, we present a procedure 
for analyzing the secret key using our estimation method. 
Section III describes the mechanisms of characteristic changes 
in the EM leakage amplitude when a fault occurs. We also report 
the results of an experiment to confirm the reasonability of these 
mechanisms. Section IV presents an experimental validation of 
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the proposed method. In the experiments, we perform IEMI-
based fault injection in a practical experimental environment, 
and estimate the fault occurrence time using the proposed 
method. Finally, Section V summarizes this paper and discusses 
useful countermeasures against fault injection threats. 
II. ESTIMATION OF FAULT INJECTION TIMING USING EM 
LEAKAGE INFORMATION 
The EM leakage information used in the proposed method is 
obtained by measuring the electrical emanation signal 
responding to cryptographic module operations. This 
information can be observed as a voltage varying between VDD 
and GND in a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) or as EM 
leakage from a power or communication cable (the mechanisms 
will be discussed in Section III). In Figure 2, the waveform 
shows the voltage varying between VDD and GND in an FPGA 
mounted on a side-channel attack standard evaluation board 
(SASEBO)-G (Fig. 1) during the AES encryption operation. The 
waveform shows the voltage varying over 11 cycles, 
corresponding to 10 rounds of AES encryption and one 
additional cycle for data I/O. 
When a transient fault is caused by fault injection, the leaked 
waveform differs from the original waveform; an example is 
presented in Figure 3, which shows voltage varying between 
VDD and GND in an FPGA on the SASEBO-G when a fault 
occurs in the eighth round of the AES. The amplitude of the 
eighth cycle is higher than in the previous waveform and the 
number of cycles has decreased by one. An increase in 
waveform amplitude is assumed to indicate the occurrence of a 
fault in the processing step corresponding to the peak cycle in 
the waveform. 
A. Secret Key Estimation using the Fault Injection Timing 
Method 
In terms of computational effort, secret key analysis by DFA 
becomes more efficient when the proposed estimation method 
for the fault occurrence time is used. Here, we describe the 
procedure for secret key analysis by IEMI-based fault injection 
and fault time estimation. This method is performed in two 
phases: the “fault injection and observation phase” and the 
“analysis phase.” Figure 4 gives an overview of the analysis 
steps.  
 In the fault injection and observation phase, IEMI-based 
faults are injected into a cryptographic device through a power 
cable. A specific frequency of continuous sinusoidal waves is 
chosen and faults are injected only into the cryptographic 
module while all other modules in the device continue to operate 
without disruption. To cause such faults at specific modules, the 
injection frequency and excitation level are selected according 
to the transfer function from an injection point to the 
cryptographic module and the other modules. During the 
Figure 2: Voltage waveform during normal AES 
encryption. 





J8 Observation point 
Figure 3: Voltage waveform during AES 
encryption with fault injection. 
Figure 4: Fault injection attack method with 
proposed fault injection timing identification method.  
 
 
injection, incorrect outputs from the fault-injected device are 
collected and their EM leakage is observed using a current probe 
with a low-pass filter attached to the power cable of the device 
and an oscilloscope to obtain the waveforms. Based on this, 
several datasets composed of three kinds of data—correct 
ciphertext, incorrect output, and EM leakage (as waveforms)—
can be obtained. 
In the analysis phase, a number of available datasets are 
chosen based on their EM leakage. This phase employs the 
estimation method for the fault injection timing described above, 
although the conditions which incorrect output must satisfy to 
be suitable for fault analysis differ for each analysis method. For 
example, using Piret’s DFA, the AES encryption output from the 
seventh or eighth round, during which the fault occurs, is 
selected. From this faulty output, analysis methods such as DFA 
can analyze the secret key value. 
III. VALIDATION OF FAULT TIMING ESTIMATION METHOD 
To demonstrate the feasibility of the fault timing estimation 
method described in Section II, we perform an experiment to 
inject faults into a cryptographic device under a timing-
controllable environment. In this experiment, faults are injected 
at the intended timing, and the increase in waveform amplitude 
corresponding to the fault injection timing is observed. First, we 
explain the mechanism of the fault occurrences to be 
reproduced in the experiment and the mechanism of the 
waveform amplitude increase corresponding to the fault 
occurrence. 
A. Mechanism of Waveform Amplitude Increase and Fault 
Occurrence 
Transient faults, as shown in Figure 3, are caused by 
overclocking. When continuous sine waves are used for fault 
injection into an electric device, the waves transmitted through 
the attachment cable are superimposed onto the clock signal. 
The waveform of the clock signal on which the sine wave is 
superimposed is shown in Figure 5. The distorted clock signal 
shown in Figure 5 may exceed the threshold value at some points 
other than the rising edge and falling edge of the normal signal. 
The electric device misidentifies the overlapped waves as clock 
risings, which in turn causes transient overclocking. 
Figure 6 illustrates the correspondence between the clock 
signal, encryption processing time, and peak of the EM leakage 
waveform. The factors that result in calculation errors and an 
increase in waveform amplitude in the case of overclocking are 
as follows. 
Mechanism of calculation error occurrence. In the normal 
clock cycle, such as the ith round in Figure 6, the interval tclock 
of the rising edges is sufficiently longer than the time tround 
required to execute one round of the process (tclock > tround); thus, 
the process is executed normally. However, when a clock glitch 
occurs, as in the (i + 2)th round, the shortened clock cycle t’clock 
is less than the execution time tround of the round process (t’clock 
< tround). In this case, the (i + 3)th round starts before the (i + 2)th 
round has been completed, and a calculation error occurs 
because the (i + 3)th round uses an incorrect input value.  
Mechanism of amplitude increase. The peaks found in EM 
leakage waveforms are related to IC operations. The transient 
current generated during the switching of the transistors 
constituting the IC causes a “ground bounce.” This ground 
bounce results in fluctuations of the power supply voltage in the 
IC, leakage of the common-mode current through the connection 
line to the outside of the device, and EM radiation, and is 
observed as the peak of the EM leakage waveform. Normally, in 
clock cycles such as the ith round in Figure 6, the round 
processing circuit operates only once, resulting in a transient 
current and EM radiation for one round of processing. However, 
when transient overclocking occurs, as in the clock cycles of the 
(i + 2)th and (i + 3)th rounds, the round processing circuit 
operates twice during one normal clock cycle, resulting in as 
much EM leakage as in two rounds. At this time, as the circuit 
operates twice at almost the same time, the transient current and 
EM radiation are higher than under normal operation. As a result, 
when a fault occurs, the peak amplitude of the EM leakage 
waveform becomes higher than under normal operation. 
B. Verification and Discussion of the Mechanism 
We inject faults into the cryptographic device using a timing-
controllable method and confirm that waveform amplitude 
increases corresponding to fault injection timing. In this 
experiment, to observe setup time violations caused by 
temporary overclocking in a reproducible experimental 
environment, a pseudo-disturbance wave is generated using a 
clock glitcher [10]. The clock glitcher is an on-chip fault 
injection circuit that can supply a glitch-inserted clock signal to 
the FPGA. The glitch-insertion timing can be controlled with an 
average resolution of 0.026 ns. 
Figure 6: Amplitude increase mechanism of side-channel 
waveforms. 
Figure 5: Disturbed waveform of clock signal during IEMI-
based fault injection. 
 
 
 The block diagram of the experimental system is shown in 
Figure 7. The experimental device is a SASEBO-G. We 
implement an AES-128 encryption circuit in FPGA1 of the 
SASEBO-G and the glitcher in FPGA2. FPGA1 operates in 
synchronization with the clock signal (shown in Fig. 8) 
generated by the glitcher. The glitch-insertion timing can be set 
arbitrarily. 
Experimental parameters such as the glitch-insertion timing, 
secret key used for encryption, and plaintext value are presented 
in Table 1. The PERIOD value in Table 1 is the interval between 
the normal clock rising and the irregular one: the inserted clock 
glitch in the insertion target round (see Figure 8). 
Using the experimental setup in Figure 7, we inserted a clock 
glitch in the eighth round of the AES encryption process. The 
fluctuation in voltage between VDD and GND of FPGA1 during 
the encryption process was observed from the J8 observation 
point on SASEBO-G. As mentioned earlier in this section, the 
EM leakage waveforms related to the processing executed in the 
IC can also be observed as EM radiation from the IC, the leakage 
of common-mode current through the connection line, and so on 
[11]. To verify the validity of the proposed method, we 
measured fluctuations in the power supply voltage of the IC, 
which is a relatively low-noise and reproducible source of a 
leakage signal. 
The observation results are shown in Figures 9 and 10. 
Figure 9 is the waveform produced when encryption processing 
is executed normally without inserting a glitch. Figure 10 shows 
a waveform in the case when a clock glitch is inserted and an 
eighth round 1-byte error occurs. This figure confirms that there 
was an increase in peak amplitude in the eighth round, which 
was the glitch insertion target. 
From the above results, it is considered that the increase in 
the peak amplitude of the waveform and the calculation error in 
the ICs are caused by overclocking. It was confirmed that the 
peak position where the glitch insertion occurred corresponds 
with the amplitude increase. Therefore, by detecting the increase 
in the peak amplitude, the fault occurrence timing can be 
specified. 
In this verification, the amplitude increase of the EM leakage 
waveform caused by the occurrence of the fault was observed as 
the fluctuation of the power supply line voltage in the IC. 
Moreover, even when fluctuations of electromagnetic wave 
amplitudes are observed outside the device, it is considered that 
a peak amplitude increase at the time of the fault occurrence can 
be detected. From past research [12], it is known that timing 
information related to processing executed in ICs leaks out of 
Figure 7: Experimental setup for glitch insertion. 
Figure 10: Waveform with glitch insertion. 
Figure 9: Waveform without glitch insertion. 
Figure 8: The glitch-inserted clock signal. 
Table 1:  Parameters for glitch insertion experiment 
 
AES circuit AES Comp. (Composite field S-Box) 
Clock frequency 24 MHz 
Secret key value 0x2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c 
Plain text value 0x3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734 
Glitch inj. target 8th round 




the device by EM waves. In [12], it was shown that EM radiation 
from a power line or a communication line connected to a device 
can be observed with an antenna or a magnetic field probe and 
used for Differential Power Analysis. Experiments reported in 
the literature have observed fluctuations in the intensity of 
electromagnetic waves depending on the information processed 
in the device. The fluctuations are small compared with the 
increase in power consumption, which is noted in this paper, 
observed at the fault occurrence. Thus, it is possible to observe 
EM leakage waveforms that can be used to estimate the fault 
occurrence timing as fluctuations in the EM leakage amplitude. 
IV. CASE STUDY USING GENERIC DEVICE 
We performed the fault injection experiment under timing-
uncontrollable environments, and attempted to estimate the fault 
injection timing using the proposed method. In this experiment, 
as a case study, fault injection was performed by IEMI on a 
generic device (SASEBO-G) that executes AES encryption. 
During the fault injection, we observed the EM leakage in order 
to obtain waveforms for fault injection timing estimation. After 
the experiment, the fault injection timings were estimated and 
their validity confirmed. Furthermore, we analyzed the secret 
key by DFA using selected faulty ciphertexts based on the 
estimation results. Through this case study, we show that the 
secret key can be easily extracted without controlling the fault 
injection timing. 
An AES-128 circuit was implemented in FPGA1 and a 
control and communication circuit was implemented in FPGA2. 
An injection probe was attached to the power cable of FPGA1 
and continuous sinusoidal waves were injected into the 
SASEBO-G through the probe and power cable. We then 
collected the outputs of the cryptographic module and the 
waveforms of varying voltage between VDD and GND of 
FPGA1 from observation point J8 on the SASEBO-G. Incorrect 
outputs were back-calculated in accordance with a decryption 
procedure based on the fact that we know the secret key value, 
and from this, we estimated the fault-injected round. Although 
the ciphertext back-calculation method is not available to 
estimate the fault injection timing in realistic attack scenarios, in 
this experiment, it was executed to confirm the validity of the 
estimation result by the proposed method. The waveforms were 
analyzed using the method described in Section II in order to 
estimate the fault injection timing. We compared the estimation 
results provided by these methods to determine the 
correspondence between them.  
A.  Injection Timing Estimation to Analyze Experimental 
Results 
This section describes the methods used to analyze the 
experimentally obtained incorrect outputs and waveforms. 
We first describe the method for analyzing incorrect outputs, 
which assumes that the secret key value for AES encryption is 
known by the estimator. Figure 11 illustrates the concept of fault 
injection timing estimation using an incorrect output and a 
correct ciphertext. In this method, an incorrect output and correct 
ciphertext are back-calculated in accordance with the decryption 
procedure, and intermediate values representing the input of 
each round of AES encryption are collected. Each intermediate 
value is composed of 16 bytes of data, from which the number 
of error bytes can be calculated through an exclusive OR 
operation applied to correct and incorrect intermediate values at 
each input round. Error bytes injected into an intermediate value 
of the AES are usually expanded by applying the MixColumns 
operation and then increasing the intermediate value. If the 
intermediate value from the fault-injected point is decrypted, the 
error bytes are expanded in the same manner as in encryption. 
Therefore, the smallest number of faulty bytes corresponds to 
the round in which the fault occurred.  
Note that this method cannot estimate the exact fault 
injection timing when multi-round faults occur. Furthermore, as 
the MixColumns operation is skipped in the tenth round of AES-
128 encryption and the error bytes are not expanded from the 
ninth to the tenth rounds, it is not possible to separate faults in 
these rounds using this estimation method. Finally, the fault-
injected round cannot be estimated when a 16-byte fault occurs 
in one round. Despite these limitations, it is possible to use the 
proposed method to correctly estimate cases in which faults 
occur on at least a few bytes. As most fault analysis methods 
require several faults, the proposed method is sufficient for 
analyzing the results of our experiment. 
Next, we describe the method for analyzing the EM leakage 
waveforms. As described in Section II, the fault injection timing 
is estimated by detecting an increase in the amplitude of a 
cyclical waveform. Although this can also be done through 
visual inspection of the waveform, the large number of datasets 
used in our assessment made it more practical for us to write an 
original analysis program. In this program, 10,000 waveforms 
from normal encryption processes are observed and input under 
the no-fault scenario. The program acquires the maximum and 
minimum values of fluctuation at each sample point. Based on 
this information, the range of normal fluctuations is determined. 
Subsequently, to check whether any sample points exceed this 
range, the waveforms observed during fault occurrence are input 
to the program. If some sample points exceed the value of 
normal fluctuations, the time at which the fluctuation occurs is 
specified as the fault injection time. That is, this process 
specifies in which round the failure has occurred.  
 Figure 11: Fault-injected round estimation by back- 
calculation and comparison of intermediate value. 
 
 
B. Experimental Setup 
Figure 12 shows a block diagram of our experimental setup. 
As described above, a SASEBO-G was used as the test device, 
with an AES-128 circuit implemented in FPGA1. The 
SASEBO-G is controlled by a PC. The value of the encryption 
key is 0x2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c and the plaintext 
is randomly generated. The clock frequency and supply voltage 
on the SASEBO-G are 24 MHz and 3.3 V, respectively. An 
injection probe (FCC F-140, 10 kHz–1.3 GHz) is attached to the 
power cable of the SASEBO-G. Sinusoidal waves (with 
frequency ~170 MHz) are generated by a signal generator 
(Anritsu MG3641A), amplified by an amplifier (Mini-Circuits 
ZHL-2-12, 10–1200 MHz), and the resulting sinusoidal waves 
(with voltage ~4 Vpp) are introduced into the SASEBO-G via 
the injection probe and power cable. An oscilloscope (Agilent 
DSO6104A) is used to observe and obtain the voltage 
waveforms between VDD and GND of FPGA1 from 
observation point J8. In addition, a DC-Block (Mini-Circuits 
BLK-89-S+) is attached between J8 and the oscilloscope, and 
the bandwidth limit function of the oscilloscope is used to filter 
out signals above 25 MHz. In this experiment, the failure timing 
was estimated by observing fluctuations in the power supply 
voltage around the IC, which is the source of the leakage signal 
in the experiments in Section III. 
Using the above setup, AES encryption was executed 
150,000 times with fault injection, and encryption results and 
waveforms were obtained. We applied the method described in 
Section IV-A to these waveforms and estimated the rounds in 
which failures occurred. 
C. Experimental Results and Discussion 
In this experiment, we obtained 9,716 incorrect outputs 
originating from transient fault occurrences among 150,043 
AES encryptions. We also obtained 94 incorrect outputs 
resulting from permanent failure occurrences. We used two 
methods—back-calculation of incorrect outputs and waveform 
analysis—to analyze all transient fault outputs in order to 
estimate the fault injection timing. 
Figure 13 shows the distributions of fault-injected rounds as 
estimated by the respective methods. In the back-calculation 
results in Figure 13, the ninth and tenth round faults cannot be 
separated; therefore, these cases are indicated as tenth round 
faults. Further, because 16-byte faults cannot be used to estimate 
the fault-injected round by back-calculation, these cases are 
indicated as unidentified faults (shown as “unknown”). Such 16-
byte faults were particularly likely to occur. 
Figure 14 shows the distribution of the number of incorrect 
ciphertexts classified by the number of error bytes at each fault 
occurrence round. The number of error bytes was estimated 
using the ciphertext back-calculation method described in 
Section IV-A. In Figure 14, the white bars denote cases where 
the estimation result of the fault occurrence round by waveform 
analysis corresponds to the estimation result given by ciphertext 
back-calculation. The black bars denote cases where the 
estimation results did not correspond. Figure 15 presents the data 
in Figure 14 as percentages. In the case of errors of 13 bytes or 
less, the estimation results correspond in at least 90% of cases. 
This shows that, when a fault with relatively few error bytes 
occurs, it is possible to estimate the fault occurrence round using 
waveform analysis. However, when the errors have 14 bytes or 
more, the estimation results often do not correspond. This is 
because it is difficult to accurately estimate the fault occurrence 
round using ciphertext back-calculation when there are a 
relatively large number of error bytes. For this reason, we cannot 
discuss the validity of the estimation results in cases with a large 
number of error bytes. However, as faults in which most of the 
intermediate value bytes are changed produce output that is 
unavailable to DFA, we consider such cases to be unimportant.  
The results of our experiment confirm that it is possible to 
estimate the fault occurrence round by waveform analysis, 
especially when the number of error bytes is small (less than 14 
bytes).  
D. Secret Key Analysis by DFA with Fault Injection Timing 
Estimation 
Using faulty ciphertexts obtained in our experiment, we 
attempted to analyze the secret key by DFA. For the analysis, 
we first selected ciphertexts that are available for DFA from all 
of the faulty ciphertexts obtained by the fault injection time 
estimation method. DFA was then executed using the selected 
faulty ciphertexts. 
We employed the faulty ciphertexts injected as seventh 
round 1-byte errors during AES encryption processing. In some 
cases, it is possible to specify the secret key values by DFA if at 
least two faulty ciphertexts satisfying this condition have been 
obtained. As the number of error bytes cannot be determined by 
the proposed estimation method, all ciphertexts judged as 
seventh round faults by the estimation method were analyzed by 
DFA. Therefore, the faulty ciphertexts to be analyzed included 
some which were not 1-byte errors. However, when DFA is 
performed using a combination of faulty ciphertexts that do not 
satisfy the condition (seventh round 1-byte error), the analysis 
result will give no candidates for the secret key.  
Of the faulty ciphertexts obtained by the experiment, 
waveform analysis estimated that 2,308 included faults that 
occurred in the seventh round. We attempted to analyze the 
Figure 12: Experimental setup. 
 
 
secret key using the first 100 acquired (to reduce the 
computational load). Of these 100, ciphertext back-calculation 
estimated 18 to be seventh round 1-byte errors (this number is 
unknown in a realistic analysis scenario). 
Secret key analysis by DFA was performed for all 
combinations (4,950 patterns) of two from 100 faulty ciphertexts. 
The DFA results are presented in Table 2. “Key value” denotes 
the specified secret key value and “Count” represents the 
number of cases (number of ciphertext combinations) in which 
the “key value” is specified as the key value candidate by 
performing DFA. When the combinations of faulty ciphertexts 
included those estimated to be 1-byte error faults by ciphertext 
back-calculation, one or more secret key value candidates were 
calculated. Additionally, for all such combinations, the key 
value 0x2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c (K1 in Table 2), 
which was used in the experiment, was calculated as a candidate 
for the secret key value. Depending on the combination of faulty 
ciphertexts, there were cases when the number of secret key 
candidates could not be narrowed down to one, and a plurality 
of secret keys remained for the candidates. In combinations 
including an error ciphertext which was not a 1-byte error, no 
secret key candidates were obtained. As a result of DFA 
execution, because the key value K1 is the most frequently 
calculated secret key candidate, it is easy to determine that it is 
the correct secret key value without knowing the correct secret 
key beforehand. 
In the analysis in this section, we performed DFA to analyze 
the secret key value using only a small number (100) of faulty 
ciphertexts given by our proposed method selected from the total 
of 9, 716. As a result, we successfully specified the secret key 
value. This case study shows that the proposed fault injection 
timing estimation method may be useful for efficient secret 
information analysis in some scenarios. 
E. Countermeasures 
For cryptographic devices, in particular, the experimental 
results confirm the risk that the computational load of fault 
analysis by DFA can be reduced, as discussed in Section IV-D. 
Here, we describe countermeasures for the above-mentioned 
threats. 
There are three major countermeasures. These are 
specifically targeted against (1) fault injection, (2) observation 
and analysis of EM leakage waveforms, and (3) secret key 
analysis by DFA. Regarding (1), as mentioned in [9], applying a 
general EMC countermeasure (suppression of noise intrusion 
into the device by ferrite core or filter) for the device should 
result in the desired effect. Regarding (2), note that the increase 
in the amplitude of the EM leakage waveform used to estimate 
the fault occurrence timing is caused by the increase in power 
consumption during fault occurrence. To suppress the increased 
transient power consumption during fault occurrence, the 
equalizer circuit [13] proposed in recent years may be effective. 
Figure 13: Distribution of estimated fault-injected round. 
Figure 14: Number of corresponding/not corresponding 
estimation results (by error byte count at fault occurrence). 
Figure 15: Percentage of corresponding/not corresponding 
estimation results (by error byte count at fault occurrence). 
Table 2:  Private key candidates identified by DFA and 
number of identified cases 
 
 Key value Count 
K1 0x2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c 153 
K2 0xc819e9ff28c9d24fab90e98809a84f3c 3 
K3 0x9392aac390ae6da6131b1588b1cf4f3c 1 




Regarding (3), the DFA countermeasure method [14-16] is 
considered to be effective. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed a method for estimating the fault 
occurrence timing in a fault injection method without timing 
control. This method involves observing the cryptographic 
operation-derived EM leakage from a power line attached to a 
cryptographic device and detecting abnormal increases in 
waveform amplitude in order to estimate fault injection timings. 
Using this estimation method, we can determine whether an 
incorrect output obtained by fault injection is available for 
performing DFA. In this study, to verify the effectiveness of the 
proposed method, we performed fault injection experiments 
using actual devices, and showed that the fault injection timing 
can indeed be estimated. Furthermore, we discriminated faulty 
ciphertexts injected during a specific process (seventh round of 
AES encryption) from other error ciphertexts, and used them to 
successfully extract the secret key.  
The fault injection timing estimation method proposed in this 
paper utilizes the property that fault occurrence timing 
information inside the IC can be determined from EM leakage. 
In this paper, we focused on a cryptographic device as the target, 
but it can be inferred that fault occurrence timing information 
inside ICs can also be acquired by observing EM radiation and 
the like in general information equipment. 
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